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Introduction 
 
Historical work from the ‘ deeper past’ about smoking has been relatively plentiful. and the 
earlier history of smoking as a cultural habit has been consistently explored1 .But there is 
still surprisingly little historical analysis of the post World War Two years.2 . These have 
been the province of journalism and of political science 3, as well as of a growing historical 
activist strand of work. 4 This paper will focus on the development of smoking policy in 
those post war years both as study in contemporary history, and also a story indicative of 
the dimensions of post war public health policy. Traditions of voluntary regulation in  
smoking policy, supported by some public health interests, came increasingly into conflict 
with an emergent militant ‘healthism’  from the 1970’s.5 The role of science and of new 
‘scientific facts’ was of central policy significance in this struggle: that scientific 
battleground  changed over time.  Policy and ‘scientific facts’ were locked into mutually 
reinforcing relationships .6 This paper aims to identify the nature and determinants of the 
changing science and policy relationships within UK smoking policy. Its purpose, unlike 
much policy commentary on smoking, is to raise historical questions about policy ,to 
establish the process of historical change in the post war period, rather than to support 
particular solutions. 
 
There has been a substantial reduction in the proportion of cigarette smokers in the UK 
population , from 51% of men and 41% of women in 1974 to 28% and 26% respectively in 
1998. While prevalence declined steadily throughout the 1970s and ‘80s, it levelled out 
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during the 1990s. However, figures for the second half of the 1990s showed smoking 
falling again among both men and women.. A clear class gradient in smoking developed 
since the 1970s when smoking was a cross class activity. In 1998, men who lived in 
‘unskilled manual’ households were nearly three times as likely as those who lived in 
professional households to smoke.  
 
Womens’ smoking increased in the immediate post war years, but, like that of men, it 
began to decline from the 1970’s. In the early 1970’s a higher proportion of men than 
women at all ages were smokers. Since then prevalence at all ages has fallen faster for men 
than for women, so there is currently a similar prevalence at all ages for men and for 
women. Prevalence fell most for those over 50 and least for those under 25. Whereas in the 
1970’s, smoking was equally prevalent at all ages between 20 and 60 years, with lower 
rates for under 16s and over 60s, the peak prevalence for both men and women is now 20-
24 years, falling progressively with age.  The social profile of smoking has also changed - 
for both men and women - and smoking  has become increasingly a lower rather than a 
cross class activity. This trend  has been especially marked for women. About 40% of 
women in all social classes were smokers in the 1960’s. By the early 1990’s, only 13% of 
women in the highest social groups were still smoking, 35% in the lowest. This figure rose 
to 60% for lone mothers, a figure constant since the 1970’s. 7 Smoking rates in young 
adults and trends over time show little difference by gender. Martin Jarvis, a leading 
smoking researcher, has commented  ‘…deprivation and family circumstances are major 
predictors of smoking, with similar associations to current cigarette smoking in men and in 
women’. 8The main cultural change in the post war years has been the increased 
marginalisation of smoking and its gradual closer association with poorer groups in society, 
both men and women, although most attention has concentrated on the latter. 
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Chronology of smoking policy in the United Kingdom. 
The periodization assigned to post war smoking policy has been unclear. Most analysts to 
date have not been writing with historical change in mind. They have been concerned either 
with ‘heroes and villains’ history 9. Or they have been concerned with the operation of 
networks and theories of policy influence, with static models of analysis 10.  The latter type 
of work has stressed the operation of rival ‘issue networks’ and ‘producer networks’ in 
policy. Historical work has dealt with the industry 11  ; that on the post war years has 
concentrated on the 1950s and the early epidemiological discoveries. 12 
This paper emphasises rather a longer time scale and a four stage chronology for smoking 
policy.13 In the first phase, the 1950s and 60s, smoking policy was marked by the cultural 
normality of smoking and by scientific and governmental uncertainty about the legitimacy 
of the new epidemiological ‘facts’ about risk.  In the second phase in the 1970s, policy 
began to emerge at the governmental level. This was premised on the reduction of harm 
and of risk from smoking.  It was marked by health education campaigns and voluntary 
agreements between government and industry, and on the scientific development of  ‘safer 
smoking’, a strategy which   also won support in public health circles. But overlapping with 
this phase came a new activist policy agenda which put the tobacco industry centre stage as 
‘the enemy’ and which stressed the role of the media both as an agent of indoctrination, but 
also as a vehicle of public enlightenment about the risks of smoking. In the 1980’s, my 
third phase, the science caught up with these new policy agendas and reinforced them : 
ideas about risk expanded through the concept of passive smoking. In the 1990s came a 
further phase as the rediscovered concept of ‘addiction’ underpinned both new scientific 
alliances and a medicalised approach to smoking treatment and prevention policy. 
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The 1950s; scientific and policy uncertainty. 
The story of the ‘discovery’ of the relationship between smoking and lung cancer through 
the epidemiological researches of Austen Bradford Hill and  Richard Doll at the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine has often been told. 14The key paper was 
published in the British Medical Journal on 30 September 1950. This was a case control 
study based on 20 London hospitals. Its conclusions were cautious. There was a ‘real 
association’ between the rise in lung cancer and smoking: the authors concluded that 
‘smoking is a factor, and an important factor, in the production of carcinoma of the lung.’15   
Further papers expanded the evidence; the results of a prospective study of British doctors 
which Doll and Hill started in 1951 continued to inform smoking policy into the 1990s. 
These conclusions about causation did not go unchallenged. One prominent opponent was 
the eminent statistician Sir Ronald Fisher, from whose work at Rothampstead agricultural 
station in the 1920s Hill had derived the original methodology for the randomised 
controlled trial. Fisher was a eugenist, whose framework was the dominant hereditarian and 
genetic paradigm of British statistics of that time. Other scientists also took up this issue, 
concentrating on the interpretation of the effects of inhalation and of giving up smoking. 16 
 
The Doll/Hill work established or refined new technical developments - large population 
based surveys, case control and prospective studies. The concept of ‘relative risk’ was first 
introduced in the smoking and lung cancer work, replacing an earlier emphasis on the 
importance of childhood in adult disease by one on risk factors for specific disease.  The 
importance of this shift of scientific gaze has been underlined by historians of the American 
smoking story. Both Allan Brandt and John Burnham have argued that the developments 
marked major changes in the relationships between epidemiology and laboratory science.17 
Changing patterns of disease, the move from infectious to chronic disease in the post war 
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years, led to a search for different models of causality and different techniques and styles of 
work 
 
The establishment of this new epidemiological risk focussed way of explaining disease was 
a gradual process of what can be seen as  ‘scientific claims building’ 18 It did not 
automatically lead to translation into policy. Other authors, Webster most notably, have 
traced the process of interaction between the Ministry of Health and its advisory 
committees in the 1950s, and also within the Medical Research Council, culminating in the 
MRC’s Special Report in 1957 accepting the causal link. This was followed by a statement 
in the House of Commons shortly afterwards expressing support for the conclusions. The 
sequence of events has been criticised for delay and prevarication and for a weak policy 
response when it came. 19  A Ministry of Health circular encouraged local authorities to 
develop health education on the risks of smoking. This response has been ascribed to the 
smoking habits of key politicians and scientific advisors. The tobacco companies funded 
research at arms length through the Medical Research Council and tobacco tax was an 
important part of government revenue, 16% of central revenue in 1950.20. Ian Macleod as 
Minister of Health remarked in 1956, ‘We all know that the Welfare State and much else is 
based on tobacco smoking’.  21 
 
This is one side of the picture.  Other factors inhibiting action were also of importance. 
Politicians and civil servants were, like scientists, uncertain about the legitimacy of the 
epidemiological evidence. Sir John Charles, the Chief Medical Officer, commented, 
‘…what I was looking for was evidence apart from the analogous or purely statistical. As 
far as I am aware, there is no purely pathological evidence of this long incubation period in 
lung cancer.’ 22  What kind of scientific proof was this? It did not offer the certainty of 
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laboratory evidence. There was suspicion of the possible temperance connections of Ernest 
Wynder, one of the American researchers whose work had paralleled that of Hill and Doll.  
‘He is a young man ‘ far gone in enthusiasm’ for the causal relationship between tobacco 
smoking and lung cancer. (I had been told when I was in New York this spring that he was 
the son of a revivalist preacher and had inherited his father’s antipathy to tobacco and 
alcohol. The American Cancer Society was very suspicious of his early work for this 
reason)’23  The politically sensitive public health issue in the 1950s was clean air and coal 
pollution, not smoking, as the governmental and Medical Research Council (MRC) debates 
make clear. The statement in the first draft of the MRC’s 1957 statement that 30% or more 
of lung cancer deaths were due to air pollution was modified  to read ‘ on balance it seems 
likely that atmospheric pollution plays some part in causing the disease, but a relatively 
minor one in comparison with cigarette smoking’ 24 Cigarettes were more politically 
acceptable  than air pollution.  
 
But smoking was a difficult issue in terms of policy making. It did not ‘ fit’ with what was 
traditionally considered appropriate as public health intervention. Much public health 
concern had been for the containment of epidemics of infectious, not chronic, disease. 
Health advice about individual behaviour modification, where it was given, had usually 
been aimed at women and children rather than at men: yet the latter section of the 
population formed the majority of smokers in the 1950s. This, to civil servants, was another 
factor militating against taking up the issue.25  Taking up smoking as a public health issue 
also had implications for the nature and funding of health education which were 
unwelcome to central government. The pre war and wartime connotations of  ‘propaganda’ 
made policy makers very wary of intervening in matters of individual habit and preference 
to prescribe preferred patterns of behaviour. Health advice of the time was notable for 
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‘stating the facts’ about smoking and leaving individuals to make up their own minds. 26 
Central government had recently divested itself of the responsibility for health education, 
held centrally during the war. It was again a local government responsibility in the 1950s, 
funded out of local rates. The Treasury was not anxious to resume central control and to 
mount a central campaign on smoking. After the Ministerial statement in 1957, health and 
local education authorities and the Central Council for Health Education (for which funding 
was devolved to the local authorities) were asked to give prominence to the connection 
between smoking and lung cancer in their activities. There was some resistance to 
widespread action in part because of the nature of the evidence and the progress of 
‘disease’. As a Ministry civil servant pointed out, god publicity in an immunisation 
campaign had produced results within a few months; but publicity on lung cancer and 
smoking might show results only thirty or forty years hence.27  
 
The medical profession played a crucial role in defining the policy acceptability of this new 
epidemiological way of seeing. The 1962 Royal College of Physicians’ report Smoking and 
Health conveyed the epidemiological case in a vivid way into both the public and the 
policy domains. The College’s committee, originally on smoking and air pollution, began 
work in 1959. Its work was significant in a number of ways. Although its original focus 
was on educating doctors, the publicity given to the published report also brought the issue 
into the public domain and to the attention of policy makers. It also very clearly dropped 
any environmental association with the rise in lung cancer deaths. Individuals, its minutes 
record, could avoid the dangers of smoking, but not those of pollution.  Air pollution, for 
the MRC as well, was a much bigger political issue. The committee was moving clearly 
towards a less politically contentious concept of health focussed more centrally on 
individual responsibility. 28 
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The response to the report within government was muted, focussing primarily on health 
education, a strategy which Enoch Powell, as Minister of Health, had recognised as 
ineffective in a 1961 minute. 29 The multiplicity of conflicting interests within government 
was clearly a factor. Treasury opposition to differential taxation ultimately prevailed, 
although not until the issue had been fully aired at the political level. This was not a 
foregone conclusion as the Cabinet committee discussions indicate. 30The role of the 
industry was important, although its representatives were called in after the political 
decisions had been taken. Also behind these decisions lay a desire to achieve a balance in 
policy and a realisation that, without a huge change in the ‘ social positioning’ of smoking, 
there was little point in initiating a major programme of change . The response of Cabinet 
secretary Norman Brook to the Cabinet committee’s suggestion of ‘ trend setting ‘ and that 
non smoking should be given a social cachet was  one of astonishment.. ‘Does this mean 
that Prime Ministers should not smoke-or at least should not be seen smoking in public?’ 
he wrote incredulously.31  
 
The primary policy impetus was therefore  the role of health education, and, increasingly,  
the regulation of public visibility though consideration of advertising control . The 1962 
RCP Report had mentioned restriction of advertising. However, the importance accorded to 
ending or restricting advertising as a symbolic aim increased over time and became a 
central plank of the public health case in the 1970’s. In 1962, after the publication of the 
RCP Report, the Tobacco Advisory Committee, subsequently Council and later the 
Tobacco Manufacturers’Association, agreed to implement a code of advertising practice 
which was intended to take some of the glamour out of cigarette advertisements. The code 
was based on the former ITA (Independent Television Authority) code governing cigarette 
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advertisements on TV. In the following year, 1965, after the publication of the 1964 US 
Surgeon General’s report on smoking, the government used the powers vested in it under 
the terms of the 1964 Television Act to ban cigarette advertisements on television. The 
Labour Minister of Health, Kenneth Robinson, announced in 1967 the government’s 
intention to introduce legislation in due course to take powers to ban cigarette coupon 
schemes, to control or ban other promotional schemes and limit other forms of advertising. 
 
Robinson’s desire to go further was however defeated by the opposition of Richard 
Crossman, who was overall Minister at the Department of Health and Social Security. 
When Robinson presented a draft bill to outlaw cigarette coupons to the Cabinet Home 
Affairs committee in July 1968, Crossman’s reaction was brusque. 
‘I…simply blurted out that this was another of those Bills which we simply couldn’t afford 
to pass when we were running up to an election because bans of this sort made us intensely 
unpopular, particularly with children and families. If you’re going to deal with the cigarette 
- smoking problem you should not try this kind of frivolous but intensely unpopular 
method. There was a tremendously violent reaction with everyone saying that here we must 
stand on moral principle. I heard it from Eirene White, Dick Taverne, and Edmund Dell, 
representing the Board of Trade which has switched its Junior Ministers round, and, indeed, 
I only had two or three people on my side. However, I’m still just powerful enough to hold 
the thing up and finally I suggested that instead of forbidding coupons we should ration the 
amount of money to be spent on advertising and leave it to the cigarette manufacturers to 
decide how they should spend their money. I found this infinitely preferable. Harmony 
achieved.’ 32  
 The episode underlined the dominance of electoral rather than ‘industry influence’ 
considerations in policy strategies. Crossman’s opposition was founded on a longstanding 
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belief in the importance of smoking as a working class habit which had to be approached 
carefully for electoral reasons. His opponents included Dell, a Minister at the Board of 
Trade, who might have been expected to have industry interests more at heart but did not in 
this instance take a pro industry line. The only formal legal restrictions in existence were 
those on sales to children which dated from the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries and the fears at that time of national degeneracy in the wake of Britain’s defeat in 
the Boer War, modified again in the 1930s. 33   
The reference to the turn of the century is relevant, because here, in the 1950s and 60s, we 
can see public health ‘ on the cusp’, moving away from the mass campaign, service 
focussed public health ethos of the interwar years towards a new type of ‘healthism’ 
epitomised by the concern about smoking. This was the harbinger of the lifestyle public 
health of the 1970s. In the 1950s and early 60s the concern was that government should not 
assume too lightly  the responsibility for advising the general public on their personal tastes 
and habits. It was up to individuals, as good citizens, to modify these if they thought fit. 
Meanwhile, both government, and public health interests, adhered to an agenda of 
reduction of risk. 
 
The 1970’s; Contested public health strategies. Activism ,risk reduction and voluntary 
agreements.  
 
The 1970s saw significant changes in this stance,with the establishment of contested public 
health strategies. The publication of the second RCP report Smoking and Health Now in 
1971 led to further action.  This government action was founded on the concept of 
voluntary regulation, of informal, non statutory agreements between government and 
industry which  became the norm in British smoking policy. These concentrated in three 
TCBH smoking policy 22.03.02. 11 
areas; advertising and sports sponsorship; health warnings on packets; and product 
modification, the latter also connected with the possible regulation of tobacco and tobacco 
products or substitutes as pharmaceuticals. Overall, policy was founded on the concept of 
reduction of risk, or limitation of harm .But there was also a dividing of the ways in the 
1970s. A new lifestyle oriented public health cohered initially round the smoking issue 
.This followed a policy line which stressed abstention rather than risk reduction and non 
cooperation with industry  through a highly charged media campaign..  
 
The regulation of these issues through voluntary agreement dated from 1971 when Sir 
Keith Joseph was Secretary of State for Health.  Joseph initiated a cross government study 
of smoking policy and its economic consequences, which was never officially published, 
and whose contents were only summarised in a Guardian article some nine years later 
34.The report concluded that either a twenty or a forty percent reduction in smoking would 
lead to a significant increase in the retired population. Small savings in health expenditure 
over twenty years would in due course be more than offset by increases in social security 
payments. But the main economic effects would be in revenue balance of payments and 
demand management fields.  Consumer demand would rise if tobacco consumption fell . 
Britain’s balance of payments would deteriorate by £50m over a five year period if 
consumption dropped by 20%.  The effects of increased taxation of cigarettes on 
consumption was unpredictable. Britain’s impending entry into the EEC in any case made 
taxation a difficult option because duty was already at a higher level than in many 
European countries. 35Joseph  had initially planned an anti-smoking Bill, but scaled down 
his demands because of only moderate backing from colleagues .36 
The first voluntary agreement between the tobacco industry and government in April 1971 
stated that all cigarette packs for sale in the UK should carry the words ‘Warning by HM 
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Government: Smoking can damage your health’.All press and posters ads were to carry the 
reference ‘Every pack carries a government health warning’ and the industry agreed to 
establish a scientific liaison committee consisting of industry and DHSS (Department of 
Health and Social Security) nominated scientists to explore less dangerous forms of 
smoking and to devise a way of measuring tar and nicotine levels. The joint committee was 
replaced in 1973 by the Independent Scientific Committee on Smoking and Health 
(ISCSH). This was composed of public health and other scientists and advised both the 
government and the tobacco industry on the issue of the development of tobacco substitutes 
and of developing a ‘lower risk’ cigarette. The ISCSH produced two reports in the 1970’s 
on these topics. Tar and nicotine tables were produced during the 1970s and their inclusion 
on packets formed part of later voluntary agreements. 
 
The relationship with the industry was close. Comment since has focussed on the role of Dr 
R. B. Hunter, chair of the ISCSH throughout the 1970s and the committee secretary,  
Dr.Andrew Nelmes, who subsequently accepted jobs with the tobacco industry. 37But the 
context within which the committee operated has received little attention. The parallels 
were with drug safety and regulation where cooperation with the industry was the norm. 
The ISCSH’s activities paralleled those of the Committee on the Safety of Medicines, 
(CSM) which was also establishing a voluntary relationship with industry in these years in 
the interests of product safety. 38  The committee’s focus was thus on safety rather than 
risk. Hunter and Frank Fairweather, chief scientific adviser to the committee, both had 
connections with the CSM. Smoking was located in the food and drug safety area of the 
Department of Health and Social Security in terms of policy responsibility. 39 
 
Negotiation over the location and form of regulation was what also lay behind the other 
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main policy initiative of the 1970s - the attempt by Dr David Owen as Labour Minister of 
Health in the mid 1970s to bring tobacco products under the licensing provisions of the 
1968 Medicines Act. Control and monitoring would have been vested in the ISCSH which 
would have taken on a more extensive statutory role. However, Owen’s departure from the 
DHSS saw these initiatives peter out under his successors. There was also legal opposition 
from one tobacco company.40  A few years later, the issue of tobacco substitutes became an 
academic one; tobacco substitutes such as Cytrel and new Smoking Material proved 
resounding commercial failures. Apart from their commercial viability,they were the 
subject of a barrage of opposition from public health researchers and health education 
interests.  41 
 
Risk reduction had initially been supported by anti smoking forces. Safer smoking had been 
one aim of the anti smoking campaigners in the 1960s and into the 70s. Changing to pipes 
and cigars, as safer forms of smoking, was included in both the 1962 and 1971 RCP 
reports. 42  When ASH (Action on Smoking and Health) was set up in 1971 as an anti 
smoking pressure group, those who worried about joining the new committee because they 
were smokers, were told that it was cigarettes rather than smoking per se with pipes and 
cigars, which was the main concern. 43 This ‘hierarchy of objectives’  paralleled the early 
nineteenth century temperance movement, which aimed to eradicate spirit consumption 
rather than stopping drinking overall. During the 1970s, this harm reduction objective 
became much less important and abstention emerged as the major aim, with the tobacco 
industry as the enemy rather than collaborator in a shared agenda. 44 
 
The roots of this significant change of public health stance were complex. New players 
entered the smoking policy arena and these had a significant impact on policy aims. The 
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foundation in 1971 of ASH as a pressure group modelled on the US Inter Agency Council, 
provided one impetus for change. ASH was a new style of health pressure group. It was 
primarily government funded: civil servants had previously pointed out that the impetus to 
introduce anti-smoking measures would be stronger if there was a voluntary movement 
pressing government from outside to take action. 45 ASH was a London centred 
organisation with few members; its major focus, in particular under the professional activist 
Mike Daube, its Director from 1973 onward, was on media publicity and hostility to the 
tobacco industry.46  Although ASH cooperated in Owen’s strategy for tobacco product 
licensing, increasingly, by the end of the decade, it felt the Labour government strategy had 
achieved little.47 
 
By the end of the 1970s a new style of public health was emergent both nationally within 
the UK and internationally as well. This stressed the role of individual prevention and 
responsibility for health, with its roots in the earlier 1950s epidemiological ‘paradigm shift’ 
epitomised by smoking and lung cancer. The concept of the ‘risk avoiding individual’ 
replaced the mass vaccination campaign image of 1950s public health. In the latter years of 
the 1970s a series of government prevention documents in the UK gave authority to these 
concepts. Smoking was a central issue and epitomised the new developments.48  
Based in this view a distinctive public health alliance developed round smoking, based 
initially on ASH and the Health Education Council (HEC), which had replaced the old 
Central Council in 1968. 49It was deeply opposed to safer smoking. In one of its 
advertisements, the HEC portrayed safer smoking as being like jumping off the 36th rather 
than the 39th floor of a tall building. Dr Donald Ball, a public health member of the ISCSH, 
published a dissenting memorandum to its second report in 1979 which urged a different 
policy line. ‘The only adequate response to the tobacco disease problem is preventative; 
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this requires measures which stop people smoking or prevent them starting.’  50 Public 
health researchers quoted science back at the committee and its conclusions. Martin Jarvis 
and Michael Russell of the Institute of Psychiatry pointed out that people smoked to 
maintain their nicotine levels, so that low tar/low nicotine cigarettes might actually cause 
more harm rather than less through ‘compensatory smoking’.  51 
 
So by the end of the 1970s, there were distinct policy positions. The ‘new public health’ 
lobby pressed for more stringent action, developing an agenda based on fiscal measures and 
the role of the media, both in terms of advertising control, and the use of the mass media 
for health campaigns. But product safety and voluntary regulation were the shared 
objectives of industry and government. These developments have been characterised from 
the political science perspective as rival ‘producer’ (industry/government) and ‘issue’ 
(public health activist) networks. 52However the situation was more complex-for public 
health and medical specialists were also involved on the product modification side through 
membership of ISCSH. 53 
 
1980s; Environment and the individual : passive smoking and rupture with the 
industry. 
The election of a Conservative government in 1979 led to a hardening of stance on all 
sides. Initially the signs of anti smoking interest in the new government were promising. 
The Secretary of State, Patrick Jenkin and his Under Secretary, Sir George Young, a keen 
anti smoker and member of the Commons All Party Group on Smoking (with the 
Conservative M.P. Lynda Chalker) used the threat of legislative action against advertising 
as part of the negotiations around a new voluntary agreement. There was no reason why 
Conservative MPs should not take up the issue. Numerous private members’ bills had been 
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introduced over the years by MPs from both parties. In the 1960s, both Sir Gerald Nabarro, 
a Conservative, and Labour MPs Laurie Pavitt and Dr. John Dunwoody had introduced 
bills, all of which were unsuccessful. However, commitment to beliefs in the freedom of 
the individual and the primacy of market forces tended to be held more widely in the 
Conservative than in the Labour party.  But anti smoking sentiment in the Department of 
Health was soon defused. Both Jenkin and Young were moved to appointments elsewhere 
in Mrs Thatcher’s reshuffle of September 1981. The possibility of legislation was lost and 
the one remaining Minister, Gerard Vaughan, was later replaced by Kenneth Clarke, a 
Nottingham M.P. with constituency interests in tobacco. 54  Mike Daube was later 
prevented from moving from ASH to a post at the Health Education Council. A leaked civil 
servant memo said that his appointment would have been a disaster. 
 
This political change arguably placed the public health alliance in a policy cul de sac. 
Members played no part in the main agenda of government which focussed on the 
negotiation of voluntary agreements. Government, in its involvement in the establishment 
of the tobacco industry funded Health Promotion Research Trust in the early 1980s, (which 
funded health research which mostly did not deal with smoking) seemed almost 
deliberately to be ignoring its concerns. And the risk of smoking was, after all, voluntary. 
 
That position was overturned in 1981, when papers by Hirayama and others in the British 
Medical Journal showed that the non smoking wives of smoking men had a higher risk of 
lung cancer. 55A steady stream of evidence appeared to support this case. In the United 
States, the Surgeon General’s report of 1986 accepted the health consequences of what it 
termed ‘involuntary smoking’ and a National Academy report of the same year assessed 
and measured its health effects. In Britain, the government accepted an Interim Statement 
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on the subject from the ISCSH (under the chairmanship of Sir Peter Froggatt) in March 
1987. In March 1988, the committee produced its fourth and last report. In a section on 
exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), the committee accepted a small increase 
in the risk of lung cancer for non smokers from exposure to ETS. Despite the uncertainties 
about quantifying risk which were attendant on this new ‘scientific fact’, the strategic 
significance of the concept was considerable.56 As Froggatt later commented, ‘The 
argument that smokers poison only themselves (or their unborn children) can no longer be 
convincingly sustained. The conceptual framework within which government, industry and 
the profession have worked, is fundamentally changed.’ 57  
 
As analyses of these events in both the UK and the US have commented, smoking control 
moved from being a matter of individual free will and the regulation of self control to a 
potential harm to the whole community and a threat to ‘innocent victims’. 58The smoker 
was an individual who harmed both him/her self and the environment and community at 
large. This shift in perception was congruent with changes in the ‘new public health’ which 
took on an environmental dimension in addition to the 1970’s focus on individual lifestyle. 
59This was a ‘scientific fact waiting to emerge’, an illustration of the interpenetration  
between scientific ‘ fact creation’ and policy : for ASH and other anti tobacco organisations 
had already begun to argue for this policy position in the second half of the 1970’s. The 
arguments then tended to be on the basis of ‘rights’, and can be seen as a development of 
arguments put forward by an earlier interwar anti smoking organisation, the National 
Society of Non Smokers’ (NSNS) which had argued against the ‘ nuisance’ aspects of 
smoking and the selfishness of smokers in inflicting their habit on others.60  The changes of 
the early 1980’s gave this position the authority of science, changing a moral issue into a 
technical scientific one although with continuing moral overtones.  
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The ‘fact’ of passive smoking was, and has continued to be, the subject of debate. Some 
emanated from tobacco industry related organisations. 61 The scientific data on passive 
smoking were critically reviewed by the tobacco industry funded statistician Peter Lee.62  
But the data were also regarded with some disfavour by anti tobacco researchers. Richard 
Peto, a leading epidemiologist, pointed out that smoking tobacco was still the greatest risk 
to the individual smoker.  63In 1998, the expert committee which had replaced the ISCSH, 
the Scientific Committee on Smoking and Health (SCOTH) published a further report on 
passive smoking which used meta-analysis, (a scientific compilation of the results of many 
different studies) to reaffirm its status as a scientific fact. It linked ETS (environmental 
tobacco smoke) to lung cancer, heart disease, SIDS,  (suddent infant death syndrome) 
asthma and middle ear disease in children. The committee recommended that smoking in 
public places should be restricted among its other recommendations. 64   
 
What was the overall impact of passive smoking as a scientific fact? It certainly symbolised 
a final rupture with the tobacco industry. ‘They (the industry) wouldn’t cooperate with me 
now. Passive smoking was the big watershed’ said one epidemiologist in an interview. 65. It 
coincided with an increasingly overt  hostility to the industry  on the part of public health 
researchers.66  Nevertheless the voluntary traditions of policy remained strong and Britain 
deliberately avoided the route of legal regulation with much less emphasis also on law 
cases against tobacco companies. The particular issues it heightened were those of public 
visibility and regulation of public and workplace space.67 But it also threw into sharp relief 
the tension within policy about what strategies were to be followed. 
On the one hand,the dominant voluntary traditions of  governmental policy making 
continued. As well as the more public agreements on advertising and sports sponsorship, 
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cooperation between government and industry in the field of research also continued, with 
the involvement of leading researchers .The ISCSH committee worked, at arms length, with 
industry through the Tobacco Products Research Trust, set up with money from the 
industry under the terms of the 1980 and 1984 voluntary agreements.68  The programme 
produced significant work on the role of nicotine, concluding that the toxicity of cigarettes 
might be reduced more if nicotine levels were reduced less then those for tar. 69This 
continued the risk reduction strand within policy making. 
 
 Passive smoking also underpinned a harsher stance and the formation of new anti tobacco 
alliances. The developing role of the BMA (British Medical Association) was one example. 
The organisation was reconstructing its rather fusty and doctor focussed image in the 1980s 
by involvement in public health issues (AIDS was another example). It took up the 
smoking issue in 1984. Here, like the HEC and ASH, with whom it worked closely, the 
BMA took a high profile media conscious stance, opposing any notion of risk reduction. 
This absolutist position was demonstrated in 1985 in the furore over Skoal Bandits, sachets 
of sucking tobacco. These made illegal by government in 1989 when regulations were 
introduced under section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act after a campaign led by ASH 
Scotland.70 . This rare example of legal restriction was, significantly, of a product aimed at 
children. In the 1990s, the anti tobacco forces, looking to the US, also turned their attention 
to litigation, although with notably small success.  
 
One anti smoking strategy was shared between government and anti tobacco forces. This 
was the important role for taxation as a tool of smoking control. Here again the 1970s had 
been the crucial decade for a change of policy.  The taxation of cigarettes was a declining 
proportion of central government revenue, but it was to become a central plank of anti 
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tobacco strategy. In 1950, tobacco tax formed 16 % of central revenue. This figure was 8% 
by the late 1960s, a figure which had fallen to 4% by 1987 and was 3.6% in 1996.71. The 
role of taxation figured in the first two RCP Reports on Smoking, but the emphasis was on 
differential taxation, imposed to discourage more hazardous forms of smoking. This was in 
line with the general emphasis at this time on ‘harm reduction’ in smoking policy. As the 
1970’s progressed, an argument on taxation became an important plank of the anti tobacco 
case. Taxation became seen as a tool of potential abstention from smoking rather than one 
for reducing harm. The Commons Expenditure committee argued in 1977 for increased 
taxation and this was taken up in the subsequent White Paper. As Daube ,then Director of 
ASH, and otherwise critical of the government’s anti smoking record, commented, 
‘cigarette taxation is the one area in which the Labour administration can be fairly proud of 
its record’72 Chancellor of the Exchequer Dennis Healey introduced regular annual 
increases in tax from 1974 to 1977 and in 1978 introduced a supplementary tar tax on 
cigarettes.  
 
This reliance on tax as a tool in smoking policy was a significant reversal of earlier post 
war political attitudes, which had stressed the potential disbenefit to poor, and to old 
smokers, from high tobacco taxes.  Health economists were beginning to have influence in 
health policy discussions in the 70s: Joy Townsend, then Chief Research Officer at the 
University of Essex Department of Economics, argued strongly for increased taxation. Her 
argument was that taxation would advantage rather than disadvantage working class 
smokers. The low price elasticity of demand for cigarettes would mean that if their price 
was raised consumers would buy fewer of them and spend more. The end result would be a 
greater proportionate reduction in the cost of living for poor families. 73. Smoking was a 
‘waste of working class life’ and policies involving taxation could help prevent this. High 
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prices would stop working class consumers from smoking. By the 1990’s, however, the 
growing class differential in smoking brought realisation that tobacco price and taxation 
had different effects on different socio-economic groups. This was highlighted by the 1994 
Marsh and MacKay report, Poor Smokers, from the Policy Studies Institute 74. The policy 
dilemma was that tobacco taxes were indeed reducing smoking, but they had had little or 
no effect on those who smoked most and could least afford it - the poorest families, whose 
smoking rates had remained high. Tobacco taxation had therefore been a means of 
amplifying rather than reducing disadvantage.This was a difficult issue to air publicly in the 
mid 1990’s because of implications for discussion of social security payments.75 The initial 
media discussions can be seen as part of the reviving  policy interest in inequalities ( or 
variations) in health. 
 
1990s; addiction and a medicalised public health 
Passive smoking had symbolised a ‘ new environmentalism’ within public health as a 
whole,moving away from the the single focus on  individual  responsibility of the 1970s. 
But this was ‘ environmental individualism’ ,the role of the individual in the domestic or 
work environment. The 1990s saw a further reorientation of anti tobacco forces and also of 
public health interests in government. The lifestyle agenda of 1970s public health, already 
modified by the environmental individualism of the passive smoking case, took a new turn.. 
A more medicalised public health was the result, based on the  ‘rediscovery of addiction’. 
The notion of ‘ involuntary smoking’ first developed through passive smoking in the early 
1980s, was modified. The lack of volition was now on the part of the individual smoker. 
 
The concept of dependence or addiction (the two were distinct historically) had not been 
absent in the smoking field in the post war period, or before then, but had not had any 
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particular policy significance. In earlier times, the idea of the cigarette as ‘enslaving’ had 
been part of general discourse. The concept of enslavement had however not been in tune 
with the key public health emphasis since the 1970s on self determination and individual 
responsibility. But addiction did become a central public health concept in the 1990s. 
Epidemiology was forming new scientific alliances as its own ability to provide 
explanation came under increasing attack; these new relationships between different 
scientific arenas had already been demonstrated in the development of the scientific case 
for passive smoking where the discovery of ‘markers’ for smoke intake had helped 
strengthen the case. 76 For addiction, the evidence came from the field of 
psychopharmacology, the effects of drugs on the mind and brain , a scientific arena which 
had been largely separate from public health epidemiology in previous decades. Smoking 
researchers accepted the inequality arguments in relation to the impact of tobacco taxation, 
but argued that the root cause was dependence or addiction and that therefore ‘treatment’ 
was needed. The medical ‘magic bullet’ was nicotine replacement therapy (NRT), free to 
those on low incomes. This policy strategy paralleled the provision of methadone to drug 
addicts, another medical public health strategy which had attained increased priority in the 
wake of AIDS. 
 
The prescribing history of NRT had been  tortuous. It moved from a ‘quack’ remedy to one 
‘owned’ by psychologists in the 1970s and 80s.In the 1990s and 200s in the Labour 
government’s policy documents – the smoking White paper, the NHS National Plan of 
2001 - it emerged as a central response to the issue of teenage mothers and their smoking 
habits. NRT was provided both within primary care and over the counter (OTC). The 
addiction NRT policy thus linked key planks of government health policy,  inequalities and 
teenage pregnancy ,the focus on primary care. The RCP gave its authority to this 
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rediscovered ‘scientific fact’ through its report on Nicotine Addiction published in 2000. Its 
cover showed a woman avidly  drawing on a cigarette. 77Anti smoking interests, which had 
been hostile to the idea of risk reduction since the 1970s, reconsidered it. The idea of a 
Nicotine Regulatory Authority was floated in policy documents, including the House of 
Commons Health Committee report on The tobacco industry and the health risks of 
smoking, published in 2000.78 The public health risk reduction agenda of the 1970s was to 
some degree reinstated ,but through a medicalised  policy  thrust. This was symbolic of a 
new ‘ pharmaceutical public health’ emergent in the 90s,in which curative intervention and 
treatment technology were classified as prevention- as a public health activity. 79 
 
Conclusion; themes and agendas. 
The particular case study of smoking throws light on the nature of British health policy 
making in the post war years. It has been the argument of this paper that neither the 
political science ‘insider/ outsider’ models nor the journalist ‘heroes and villains’ 
arguments do justice to the complexity of interactions within this area of  policy.  From the 
1970s, smoking policy agendas bifurcated  ,with strands  which aimed at reduction of risk; 
and elimination of it. The influence of doctors, epidemiologists and other scientists  was of 
continuing importance, in some cases working across what were often presented as deep 
divides within policy.  Public health interests and scientists  were involved in these 
government committees, some of which also linked to industry. The voluntary regulation 
traditions of policy making for smoking were shared with areas seen within government as 
related, in particular medicines control, where cooperation with industry was also the norm. 
The expert committee was  a key site of interchange between science and policy in the 
British smoking story - both in the RCP committees outside government, and in the role of 
the ISCSH and its successor SCOTH (Scientific Committee on Smoking  and Health) This 
TCBH smoking policy 22.03.02. 24 
distinctive British configuration deserves to be stressed, if only because the  US  history, 
operating from the start within a more legalistic tradition, is often seen as the universal 
historical model. 
 
Science and the role of scientific facts was a crucial animating force. Smoking policy in its 
changes of emphasis, was emblematic of the reconfiguration of post World War Two 
public health and its scientific orthodoxies. Smoking was the  major issue which marked 
the redefinition of public health around lifestyle issues. The ‘new public health’ policy 
programme’ focussed on fiscal (taxation) and media strategies (advertising bans and mass 
media campaigns) with a new and distinctive role for  ‘health activist’ groups like ASH  
with a strongly anti industry stance.This was a model of public health activism  which was 
replicated in other areas, for example diet and heart disease. Epidemiology became the 
public health science - but redefinitions in public health in the 1980’s and ‘90’s - towards 
greater environmental and biomedical emphases - were reflected in new scientific alliances 
and new concepts like passive smoking and addiction. It has been the argument of this 
paper that these scientific facts and policy positions were constitutive of each other. Policy 
objectives and agendas  defined what was legitimate and illegitimate science as well as the 
other way round.  In the 1990s industry, but this time the pharmaceutical industry, became 
an ally rather than an opponent of control because of the pharmaceutical remedies 
available. The 1970s hostility to the tobacco industry was heightened as this alternative 
industrial alliance was cemented. Policy was also a matter of central/ local relationships as 
the issues of workplace regulation and of the impact of Scotland on policy development 
indicate.80 Increasingly, the European and international dimensions of policy making came 
to the fore .Smoking policy, in particular anti smoking  derived  legitimacy through the 
dissemination of  transnational models of policy making.81  
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Policy making and the agendas of activists , of industry and of politicians also interacted 
with the more intangible processes  of cultural change, the relative marginalisation of 
tobacco and its ‘de- normalisation’  in the post war years.The cultural context of smoking 
changed .Anecdotal evidence confirms that picture. Smoking was culturally destabilised, no 
longer an activity  for polite society. The public health researcher Walter Holland 
remembered how Bradford Hill, long after the initial smoking and lung cancer research was 
published, would keep a  full cigarette box in his room at the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine ready to offer to visitors. Eventually he asked Hill why he continued 
to do this, given his own research conclusions . Hill was horrified.’ But it would be ill 
mannered not to offer  visitors a cigarette’ 82. Gladwell’s discussion of  cultural  ‘ tipping 
points’ is relevant here to the interaction between culture and formal regulation , part of a 
complex historical process which marginalised smoking in post war Britain83 Along with 
that cultural redefinition of tobacco have gone various attempts to recategorise and redefine 
it as a substance. Are tobacco and its active principle nicotine  to be termed medicine, 
substance, or ‘drug’?  Tobacco  was a ‘borderline substance’ (a term used within 
government regulation) and this definition has both reflected and contributed to the nature 
of the policy response. Assessing the impact of that policy response is a further complexity 
. 
The case of smoking policy thus contributes to a wider history of post war policy making in 
public health. Its developing historiography also indicates an important role for 
contemporary  health history and its practitioners. Archives and historical data  have  begun 
to play an important role in anti tobacco activism in recent years . This usage presents some 
of the problems of  writing history ‘ through the wrong end of the telescope’. Time specific 
and contingent analysis is absent; and models of positivist scientific discovery 
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predominate.84 This is reminiscent of the difficulties of ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ history 
,much discussed among nascent social historians of medicine. At such a stage in the current  
health policy historiography  ,it is important that contemporary historians join in. 
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